'How must a world be constituted for a moral being?'
notion is rather that, if an argument can be constructed from broadly Kantian premises to Schellingian conclusions, then that is all to the good from the point of view of elucidating an undoubtedly profound but also very puzzling work, one which moreover may readily seem, particularly in Hegelian eyes, to be leading the post-Kantian development away from its rationalist core into wilder, Schopenhauerian and protoHeideggerean territory. The intention in short is to show that, whatever its ultimate degree of success, the Freiheitsschrift neither breaks with the original concerns of German Idealism nor leads it astray. According to Kant, although our freedom must be deemed in the final instance incomprehensible: 'reason would overstep all its bounds if it took it upon itself to explain how [...] freedom is possible'. 6 What philosophy can nonetheless do is specify the conditions of free agency, and underwrite its incomprehensibility -there can be a metaphysical explanation of its resistance to rational insight, which at the same time reassures us of freedom's reality. The conditions Kant sets on free agency are fourfold.
In order to act freely, it must be true that the agent could act (or could have acted)
otherwise than she does (did). Second, the determining grounds of the action must lie within the agent's control or power, in meiner Gewalt. Third, their action must be determined not empirically but by reason. Fourth, the agent must be if not motivated then at least motivatable by pure practical reason, the moral law. And in order for these four conditions to be fulfilled, Kant argues, two metaphysical conditions have to be met.
First, the agent must have the peculiar power of reflexive causality or spontaneous selfdetermination that Kant calls transcendental freedom, defined as 'an unconditioned causality which begins to act of itself'. Second, the agent and her action must have intelligible grounds: the action must be the product of intelligible causality issuing from the agent's intelligible character. Kant thinks that if transcendental idealism is assumed, and under no other condition, can these metaphysical conditions be fulfilled. 7 Transcendental idealism is thus a condition for the justified attribution of freedom to human agents.
For present purposes all issues concerning the grounds and interconnections of these various claims, along with the pressing epistemological questions surrounding Kant's account, can be put aside. What I want to focus on is the particular metaphysical difficulty that critical discussion of Kant's theory of freedom in the very earliest years of Kant reception brought to light. The two central figures here are Carl Christian Erhard Schmid, and Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Both professed themselves Kantians, believed that Kant's teachings on freedom require clarification, and proceeded to rework Kant's theory. The conclusions they came to are however diametrically opposed. According to Schmid, the exercise of reason must be intelligibly determined, and the intelligible fatalism (as he calls it) which this entails represents a consistent and defensible position which Kantians should espouse. 8 According to Reinhold, Kant's theory must be recast in terms of an irreducible power of self-determination, a capacity to bring about states of affairs by virtue of one's so choosing and nothing else -which Reinhold, following Kant, calls Willkür, the power of choice that sets the self in motion, as opposed to Wille, the power of practical reasoning by virtue of which one merely comes to know the moral properties of actions. 9 Schmid's reasoning is simply that, if no intelligible causality governs human agency, then freedom is reduced to mere accident, Zufall, and its moral meaning is destroyed, whereas intelligible determinism, Schmid asserts, is sufficient for moral purposes, for it (at least) lifts us out of natural causality. Reinhold, quite reasonably doubtful that a deterministic supersensible realm can be considered any more hospitable to morality than a deterministic sensible realm, argues that freedom is a basic power distinct from the power of practical reasoning, independent of the other powers of the mind and not explicable in terms of any other more fundamental concept, and no more mysterious than the faculty of empirical knowledge: freedom is 'fully comprehensible', völlig begreiflich.
Plainly not both of these accounts can be correct as an interpretation of Kant. It is also clear where their respective weaknesses lie. As another contemporary, Christian
Andreas Leonhard Creuzer, pointed out, the strength of each is the weakness of the other. 10 But a difficulty still awaits freedom insofar as it is to be united with the mechanism of nature in a being that belongs to the sensible world, a difficulty which, even after all the foregoing has been agreed to, still threatens freedom with complete destruction [...] [I]f it is granted us that the intelligible subject can still be free with respect to a given action, although as a subject also belonging to the sensible world, he is mechanically conditioned with respect to the same action, it nevertheless seems that, as soon as one admits that God as universal original being is the cause also of the existence of substance (a proposition that can never be given up without also giving up the concept of God as the being of all beings and with it his all-sufficiency, on which everything depends), one must admit that a human being's actions have their determining ground in something altogether beyond his control, namely in the causality of a supreme being which is distinct from him and upon which his own existence and the entire determination of his causality absolutely depend. 12 In such circumstances, Kant says, a human being 'would be a marionette or an automaton', 'built and wound up by the supreme artist; self-consciousness would indeed make him a thinking automaton, but the consciousness of his own spontaneity, if taken for freedom, would be mere delusion' -since, although the proximate determining causes of thought would be internal to the agent, 'the last and highest' cause would be 'found entirely in an alien hand'. Kant explicitly refers to the threat thereby posed as 'Spinozism'. 13 The solution offered in the second Critique involves transcendental idealism once again, but deployed in a different way from the Third Antinomy of the first
Critique. Were God the creator of beings in the sensible world, Kant tells us, then freedom would be annihilated; but appearances are the work of the human subject, whose forms of intuition are space and time. God thus cannot fix the facts in the realm of appearance:
[T]he concept of a creation does not belong to the sensible way of representing existence or causality but can only be referred to noumena. Consequently, if I say of beings in the sensible world that they are created, I so far regard them as noumena. Just as it would thus be a contradiction to say that God is a creator of appearances, so it is also a contradiction to say that as creator he is the cause of actions in the sensible world and thus of actions as appearances, even though he is the cause of the existence of the acting beings (as noumena).
14 Human freedom is not itself an appearance, but human agency consists in a synthesis of practical reason with appearance, so if appearance falls outside the scope of divine determination, then so too does human agency. Insulating appearances from God's determining power thus makes human freedom possible. Transcendental idealism as invoked in response to Spinozism seeks to cut loose empirical reality metaphysically from things in themselves, the objects of intellectual intuition which compose Spinoza's ontology. Kant's argument is that, if things in themselves were the sole constituents of reality, then reality would not contain freedom; but there are also appearances, and this makes freedom possible in the face of Spinozism.
The difficulty is to understand the sense in which the world of appearances, Are appearances merely a part of a larger reality, or are they in some way a reality of their own? But freedom, confronted by Spinozism, is what makes it burst forth as a problem, since in that context -and not in that of empirical knowledge, nor in that of the Third Antinomy, for in neither of those less pressurized and demanding contexts does the empirical/intelligible relation or the constitution of the intelligible need to be specified determinately -we need to be able to spell out the doctrine of transcendental idealism in a way which shows it to underwrite human freedom.
In sum, it seems that the gains that Kant makes by referring human freedom to an intelligible ground are offset by a fundamental problem. That the intelligible grounds of human agency, our intelligible character and exercise of causality of reason, are subject to further intelligible determining conditions is a genuine possibility, which nothing in Kant's system rules out; Kant gives no reason for thinking that the Principle of Sufficient Reason fails to apply to things in themselves. And even if this wholly general worry is regarded as an idle, 'merely theoretical' possibility which the interests of practical reason entitle us to put aside, there are two aggravating considerations which restore its force.
(i) First, the fact of human evil obliges us, as Ulrich, Schmid and Creuzer all point out, to regard the intelligible determination of our intelligible agency as more than a mere conceptual possibility: on the face of it, given Kant's identification of morality with pure practical reason and of the causality of reason with intelligible causality, the natural inference to draw when confronted with immoral conduct is that some intelligible factor has impeded our intelligible agency; which gives positive reason for thinking that, in the intelligible domain, our agency is not causally insulated.
To be sure, Kant has an account of evil which precludes the postulation of any such extraneous intelligible factor -his doctrine of radical evil, which says that our intelligible disposition to give preference to incentives of self-love over moral incentives is rooted in an intelligible choice of that very disposition. But the motivation for this doctrine, the reason for affirming it, derives entirely from practical interest, our practice of holding ourselves and one another morally responsible, the integrity of which is here in question; and in any case, Kant himself admits that the postulation of radical evil explains nothing and generates a regress, thus failing to satisfy the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
(ii) Second, Kant leaves us at a loss when it comes to thinking up a configuration for the intelligible realm which would so much as grant a toehold for transcendental freedom. Kant denies that a Leibnizian characterization of the intelligible realm would be consistent with human freedom, and he in any case affirms that the correct (or at any rate, the most warranted) conceptualization of the intelligible realm is not Leibnizian This, admittedly perfunctory, assessment of Kant's solution to the problem of human freedom is of course contestable. 15 What matters for what follows, however, is that it corresponds in its essentials to Schelling's estimate of Kant's legacy on the topic. 
Schelling's conception of human freedom in the

Gleichgewicht, as Schelling calls it):
For the usual concept of freedom, according to which freedom is posited as a wholly undetermined capacity to will either one of two contradictory opposites, without determining reasons but simply because it is willed [. shown that this totality is of a kind capable of containing free subjects and endowing them with freedom -something that Spinoza did not do (to that extent justifying Kant's rejection of Spinozism). Third, Kant's difficulty in uniting intelligible character with transcendental spontaneity must be resolved.
A problem for Schelling's Spinozism: whence the finite?
To these a fourth element must be added which, though not on the explicit agenda of the Freiheitsschrift, is undoubtedly on Schelling's mind in 1809, and it will be important for my reconstruction of his strategy. This is the problem of the derivation of the finite from the infinite -the question, which Schelling had wrestled with in the course of his attempt to formulate a Spinozistic post-Kantian idealism from 1801 to 1804, of how there can be a world of finite things 'in addition to' the absolute (so to speak). 21 Karl August Eschenmayer, a fellow traveller of Schelling's Naturphilosophie who however entertained misgivings about his Identity Philosophy, emphasized the importance of this question in his 1803 Die Philosophie in ihrem Übergange zur Nichtphilosophie, suggesting that it was decisive for the alternatives of either a wissenschaftlich (Schelling) or a trans-rational glaubensphilosophisch (Eschenmayer) solution to the problem of the absolute. 22 The question had been treated previously by Schelling himself on several occasions. In the 'Allgemeine Deduktion' of 1800, Schelling answered the question of how something finite and real can proceed from the infinite, by appeal to an infinite striving of nature to return to the original identity out of which it was torn by an original division -which he however leaves unexplained. 23 In the 1801 Darstellung the question was again raised and this time answered in a complex twofold manner, by on the one hand rejecting its presupposition 'that absolute identity has actually stepped beyond itself', and on the other hand relativizing the separation of individual being from the absolute to reflection which has already withdrawn and isolated itself from the absolute centre. 24 In Bruno (1802) Schelling employed a closely similar if not the same strategy, again insisting on the containment of the finite within the eternal, and referring the separateness of the finite to the perspective of the finite. However that may be -that is, whether or not the 1804 account is adequate, and whatever Schelling thinks about it -it is also true, I will argue, that the Freiheitsschrift offers a different solution to the problem of the finite, and one which is more convincing. God, from the ground of his existence -which, Schelling says, should be conceived as indeterminate objectless will or as longing or yearning. The implicit object of this primal will or longing, the final cause which draws it out of itself, is understanding and self-consciousness, knowing itself as something existing, a formed unity. When this development is complete, we have God as God. The ground of God's existence has not however been consumed or sublated in this process -Schelling refers to it as an 'indivisible remainder', and it abides as the ground which continues to give God being as God. God has therefore an internal complexity, comprehending two principles, one rational and one pre-rational; principles of light and darkness, as Schelling calls them.
The metaphysics of the Freiheitsschrift: theogony and the creation of free beings
Were Schelling a theist, the next step would be the creation of man and world, as a separate and further matter; which would involve God's exercising will and judgement, in the way that Leibniz supposes, and which, Schelling believes, renders the problems of evil and human freedom insoluble. But on Schelling's pantheistic account, man and the world result not from a separate act of creation but come to be in the course of God's self-genesis -their existence is implicated in God's becoming, and God does not come to completion without man and world. And this implies -what is crucial for
Schelling's theory of evil -that the same duality of principles that makes up the being of God also makes up the being of man (and other creatures): the distinction of existence and ground of existence, principles of light and darkness, applies to man as it does to God -but with the essential difference that while these principles are inseparable in
God (who is a necessary unity) they are separable in man. And this yields the possibility of evil: a condition in which the principles have come apart, the non-rational principle of darkness claiming for itself an independent existence. Evil consists in striving to give oneself, wilfully claiming for oneself, a selfhood independent of God. The locus of evil thus lies for Schelling, as it does for Kant, in the disposition of the individual subject, and the determination of this disposition, the individual's decision for either good or evil, takes place (as per the Fichtean conception of the being of the self as that of an act)
at the point where the individual comes into existence, a point not in time but eternity.
Man is in the initial creation, as shown, an undecided being -(which may be portrayed mythically as a condition of innocence that precedes this life and as an initial blessedness) -only man himself can decide. But this decision cannot occur within time; it occurs outside of all time and, hence, together with the first creation (though as a deed distinct from creation). Man, even if born in time, is indeed created into the beginning of the creation (the centrum). The act, whereby his life is determined in time, does not itself belong to time but rather to eternity: it also does not temporally precede life but goes through time (unhampered by it) as an act which is eternal by nature. Through this act the life of man reaches to the beginning of creation; hence, through it man is outside the created, being free and eternal beginning itself. As incomprehensible as this idea may appear to conventional ways of thinking, there is indeed in each man a feeling in accord with it as if he had been what he is already from all eternity and had by no means become so first in time. (FS, 385-386)
The strategy of the Freiheitsschrift: analysis and interpretation
The preceding is a very compressed and incomplete précis, in which two compact passages from Schelling have been asked to assume the main burden, but it supplies enough for us to now be able to grasp how the Freiheitsschrift offers a complex solution to the four problems identified as its targets. I argued that Schelling aims to (1) identify the positive ground of evil, (2) explain how free individuality can reside within God,
explain how intelligible necessity can coincide with spontaneous self-determination, and (4) account for the possibility of the finite world. Schelling takes these apparently independent problems and proceeds to solve them in the manner of simultaneous equations, that is, by cross-referring them to one another. The reality of evil appears to set an insoluble problem, not just to Kant but to all metaphysics, for the reasons that Schelling goes over in the early part of the Freiheitsschrift -in short, because no coherent way of introducing evil into the fabric of being can be conceived (at any rate:
as philosophers have hitherto conceived being). And the existence of the finite world appears to set an insoluble problem for monism, so long as the absolute is conceived as an absolute identity -the problem that Schelling's Identity Philosophy had left unresolved. But when the existence of evil and the existence of the finite world are taken together as interconnected primary data for metaphysical speculation, the basis is laid for the account we have seen Schelling give of God's genesis and our genesis inand-with God, through which the problems associated with each are dissolved. (Re 4:)
We discover in human evil the reason why there is a world of finite things, in so far as the structure of free human personality -its unity of opposing principles -articulates a ground which makes the existence of the finite world intelligible. We now understand why the problem of the finite world proved intractable for the system of absolute identity, forcing it into equivocation, and why the doctrine of Abfall in Philosophie und
Religion -when read in light of, and as anticipating, the standpoint of the Assuming this to be a correct analysis of Schelling's strategy, let me now say how I think it is ultimately grounded. The Freiheitsschrift may be interpreted as taking the structure of free human personality -rather than merely the structure of theoretical and practical self-consciousness, which does indeed belong to its core but which does not constitute it as a whole -as the guiding principle for the construction of metaphysics. 30 The structure which Schelling finds in man and imputes to God is that of The feature of the opposition of good and evil that allows it to play a privileged role in metaphysical construction is the asymmetry regarding their respective relations Let me try to make clearer my suggestion that the opposition of good and evil in some way exhibits, gives oblique access to, the dislocation or disunity within being which Schelling expresses in terms of his distinction of existence from its ground. This distinction, on which the whole argument of the Freiheitsschrift turns, involves a modification of our understanding of ontological talk, and is intended as revisionary; as if to underline its revisionary character, Schelling intimates that the ground of existence is tainted with non-being, that is, cannot itself be said unequivocally to exist or have being. Schelling's thesis concerning being is therefore not simply that it has fundamentally different types, on a par with the distinction of Nature and Spirit, or of the potential and the actual: it is that there is a complexity and conceptual opacity in being which is concealed in plain ontological assertion, such that the notion of something's simply existing or having existence, simply 'being the case', is defective.
The assumption that existence as such is transparent and non-complex is present in, but not confined to, ordinary understanding: it extends to the highest speculative systems, Spinoza's and Hegel's included. Hegel says in the Encyclopaedia Logic that, although we cannot stop with mere being, and although being is not firm and ultimate and will be seen to turn dialectically into its opposite, it is nonetheless absurd to regard any content of consciousness as 'beside' and 'outside' being, or as 'additional' to it. 35 This assumption of absolute primitive simplicity, which allows Hegel to set 'pure being' (the 'pure thought' of what is 'quite simply being', eben nur das Sein ist) at the beginning of his
Logic, is what Schelling must be taken to be challenging. The rival position articulated in the Freiheitsschrift is that the non-simplicity of being is attested in our knowledge of good and evil, and of ourselves as entities for whom both are possibilities -something which would not be possible if existence were the simple thing that it is taken to be in the ontologies of common sense, Spinoza, and Hegel. In sum, Schelling's argument is that, if existence were the bare and simple fact that it is naturally and universally taken to be, then it would be impossible for anything to exist with the possibility for good or evil, and since the practical point of view reveals that such a being does exist, existence cannot be simple. Though good and evil are necessarily unified -in so far as both fall within the span of a self's field of decision -the distance that separates them, the degree and kind of their opposition to one another, is too great to be contained within a single domain of 'existing things'. If we are to think both good and evil as having being, as we must, then the ordinary concept of being must be reconfigured.
Can Schelling be said to have explained the existence of evil, freedom, and the finite, in the Freiheitsschrift? Has he made freedom and evil comprehensible in the sense denied by Kant? At one level, it would seem so. What emerges from the enquiry is a unified systematic solution to several problems, according to which God, the world, man, human freedom, and evil, can all be derived from the structure of being. So we have metaphysical explanation in the full and proper sense. And as Schelling emphasizes in the close of the essay, the Freiheitsschrift does the work of a traditional theodicy, supplanting Leibniz: it has been shown that God is as he needs to be, and does all that needs to be done, in order for the highest value to be realized; evil has positive reality, yet all is for the best. Putting it like this, however, misses something important, the very thing that distinguishes the Freiheitsschrift from other treatments of the problem of evil. The crux of Schelling's strategy, I suggested, lies in repositioning the relevant explananda -freedom and evil -at the outer limit of philosophical understanding, and in showing that this limit cannot be regarded as subjective, a consequence of the limits of our cognitive powers, but must be regarded as objective, as 
